Libya: The illusion of force
A no-fly zone will deliver too little, too late. The Libyan rebels' greatest asset is who they are
The front page of the New York Times website demonstrated at one point yesterday the irony of deploying the most mobile and powerful army in the world. And it has nothing to do with theories about the utility of force.In one report, US troops are struggling to persuade Afghan troops and police to fight the Taliban in Ghazni province in Afghanistan. Next to it isa report from Benghazi, Libya, where the local determination to fight Gaddafi is etched in deep lines on every face, but where the means to do so are wholly absent. In the former, US officers talk sceptically about the strategy. They call it the deep disconnect between the tactical (and possibly temporary) victories of US units against the Taliban, and the strategic aim of leaving a functioning Afghan state in place when they leave. In Libya, the only disconnect is between the will to fight and the means to do so effectively. The opposition is overwhelmed by the logistical problems of resupplying the front, maintaining political unity and simply answering the phone. Is this an argument for US soldiers doing in Libya what they are failing to do in Afghanistan?
The pressure in Britain, France and the US for a no-fly zone is building, fed not least by hourly reports of heavy fighting in Zawiyah (almost obliterated, but where fighters are still repelling attacks), around Ras Lanuf and in Bin Jawad. Gaddafi's response yesterday to the possibility of western intervention provides a foretaste of the nationalist power he would gain if bombs started targeting his air defences, the precursor to establishing such a zone: "They want to take your petrol. This is what America, this is what the Frenchman, those colonialists want. The Libyan people will take up arms against them." The moment Britain, France or the US became militarily involved, it would be Gaddafi versus the colonial powers, past and present, of the Middle East. It would cease to be Gaddafi, the family firm, versus his own people.
Members of Nato meeting today in Brussels should be clear about avoiding a disconnect between reality and policy in Libya. This is already inherent in some of the claims that have been made about a no-fly zone. Let us be clear what it would not do, even if it had the authority of a UN security council resolution. It would not be immediate. A no-fly zone could take until mid-April to put in place, by which time the situation on the ground could be very different. It would have less effect against helicopters, which are more lethal weapons in this form of combat, than it would have against jets, and as Ivo Daalder, the US ambassador to Nato acknowledged, overall air activity is not the deciding factor in the firefights between the rebels and regime loyalists and mercenaries. It would not deter columns of trucks and artillery pounding rebel positions. It would, however provide lots of soundbites to politicians wanting to appear as if they are doing something.
No decisions are easy ones and we now have to prepare for the bleakest and bloodiest scenario – a protracted civil war between two militarily unmatched sides. Unlike Tunisia and Egypt, the regime has decided to stand and fight, and has even fewer qualms about mowing down its own people than Ben Ali and Mubarak. The rebels have both to wage a conventional war against superior forces and weaponry, and forge some form of political unity. They could use military intelligence, signal jamming and expertise in forging their fighters into a cohesive force.
Their biggest weapon remains their cause and who they are. Not agents of al-Qaida or the proxies of western colonialism, but Libyans who have risen up after decades of brutal repression. Tripoli is unlikely to fall militarily, but the regime is still capable of imploding if and when the military tide turns. We should not forget the lessons of Egypt and Tunisia in Libya. The more brutality Gaddafi employs, the quicker he hastens his own end.
